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INTRODUCTION 
“When you talk about the debate on Turkey’s E.U. membership,” 
a German of Turkish origin who serves in the Parliament of the 
European Union explains, “it immediately becomes a talk about 
head-scarf issues and building mosques.”1 This is in part because 
 * B.A., Ph.D., and J.D., Yale University, Professor of Law, The George 
Washington University Law School; Member, Institute for Advanced Study, 
Princeton New Jersey 2008-2009. The author thanks Dean Frederick Lawrence, 
The George Washington University Law School, and the Institute for Advanced 
Study for research support, reference librarians Kasia Solon and Herb Somers for 
their help, Ralph Ghadban for his comments on an earlier draft, and Paul Kraczek 
for his excellent research assistance, especially for translating materials from the 
original German. The author is also indebted to Richard Alba, and to Roland 
Kempner, a German lawyer, for his introduction to German law bearing on the 
treatment of religion in schools and his assistance with related projects. 
 1. Anna Mulrine, Europe’s Identity Crisis, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 
10, 2005, at 36. 
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Western Europe has long considered itself a “Christian Club.”2 The 
treatment of second-generation Turks in Germany and other 
European countries offers a window into the obstacles that must be 
confronted and overcome before Turks gain full equality in Europe. 
Totaling about four million, persons of Turkish origin make up the 
largest immigrant group in Europe, and virtually all of them are 
Muslims.3 So when the European Union rendered Turkey “eligible” 
for membership—a long process described elsewhere in this issue4—
Prime Minister Erdogan proclaimed that the invitation proved 
Europe was “not a Christian Club” after all.5 But what does it mean 
to call an increasingly secular Europe a Christian Club? To a 
substantial degree, the culture that unifies Europe today is defined by 
the “other” who is not part of that culture.6 The Christian Club, then, 
may be seen as cultural rather than overtly religious, and Turks may 
represent the quintessential “other.”7
This Article explores the status of Turks who reside in the 
European Union by drawing in part from the social science literature 
on the second generation of contemporary immigrants—that is, the 
children of migrant parents, raised in the receiving society—a field 
 2. See Ian Ward, The Culture of Enlargement, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 199, 207 
(2005-06) (quoting German Chancellor Helmut Kohl) (observing that EU 
enlargement brings “into ever sharper focus” differences between traditional 
European self-identification and Turkish culture and religion). The European 
Union ultimately rejected Kohl’s viewpoint when it omitted any mention of 
Christianity, or for that matter God, in its draft Constitution. Treaty of Lisbon 
Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. As of 2008, it is 
unclear whether the Treaty will ultimately be ratified by all 27 states. The Lisbon 
Treaty: The Ratification Game, ECONOMIST, June 26, 2008 (reporting that only ten 
of the twenty-seven EU member states have fully ratified the Treaty, which 
requires unanimity). 
 3. Maurice Crul & Hans Vermeulen, The Second Generation in Europe, 37 
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 965, 968-70 (2003) (noting that over half of Europe’s 
Turkish population is in Germany). Cf. Ward, supra note 2, at 207 (noting that 
“virtually all” people in Turkey are Muslim). 
 4. See Fernanda Nicola, Turkey’s Admittance to the E.U., 24 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 711 (2009). 
 5. Ward, supra note 2, at 210. 
 6. See id. at 207. 
 7. See id. at 215-17 (citing EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM xviii, 1-2, 70 
(25th anniv. ed., Vintage Books 2003) (1978)) (arguing that Turkey’s Muslim 
culture and geographic proximity embody a construction of Orientalism critical to 
European self-identification). 
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whose practitioners concede it is still “in its infancy.”8 This Article 
focuses on Germany because it is home to more than half of 
Europe’s Turks, and on youth, because an important test of the 
permeability of social boundaries is whether the second and third 
generations of immigrants can cross them. Part I provides an 
overview of the demography and history of Germany’s Turkish 
population, and introduces the questions I will be examining. Part II 
turns to the educational system, focusing on the stratification of 
students into tracks that have a lifelong impact on career paths and 
socio-economic status, and the correlation between ethnicity and 
assignment to the lowest track. Part III examines religious identity 
within the public school system as played out through the differential 
treatment accorded to training in Islam during the school day when 
compared to classes offered to children who practice other major 
religions. Finally, Part IV explores some lessons one can draw from 
the experience of second-generation Turks in Germany, and what 
their apparent lack of mobility augers for the treatment of Turkey as 
an equal partner in Europe, assuming that it gains acceptance into the 
European Union. Finally, this Article concludes that despite recent 
progress, legal and cultural barriers continue to inhibit the 
assimilation of German Turks into mainstream German society. 
I. THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF TURKISH 
IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR CHILDREN IN 
GERMANY 
Roughly half of all Turks in Europe live in Germany. There are 
approximately 3.5 million Muslims of all nationalities in Germany, 
constituting about 4% of the German population.9 As in the rest of 
the European Union, most of Germany’s Muslims are of Turkish 
origin. About 2.7 million Turks live in a reunited Germany, 
predominantly in the former West and in Berlin.10 Persons of Turkish 
 8. Roxane Silberman, Richard Alba & Irène Fournier, Segmented 
Assimilation in France? Discrimination in the Labour Market against the Second 
Generation, 30 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1, 1 (2007). 
 9. Fed. Office for Migration and Refugees, F.R.G., Islam in Germany, 
http://www.integration-in-deutschland.de/nn_284456/SubSites/Integration/EN/03_ 
_Akteure/ThemenUndPerspektiven/Islam/Deutschland/deutschland-node.html?__n 
nn=true (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). The German government does not collect data 
on religious affiliation, so no exact numbers are available. Id. 
 10. Cf. FED. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, F.R.G., MIGRATION AND 
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origin account for approximately 2.4% of the total population of 
Germany, although they make up a much higher proportion of the 
residents of certain areas.11 When pundits assert that “[t]he 
integration of Muslims into German society is a forefront issue,”12 
they are largely referring to Germans of Turkish origin. 
The history of Turkish immigration to Germany is well 
documented. Turks began immigrating to Germany in the 1960s and 
1970s, when West Germany welcomed Turks as casual laborers or 
“guestworkers.”13 Initially, Germany expected Turkish men to come 
without their families and then to return home.14 The foreign laborers 
shared this expectation. They thought of themselves as sojourners, 
transient residents who would ultimately return to their homeland.15 
But many Turkish laborers eventually sent for their families, children 
of Turkish parents were born in Germany, and whole families often 
settled in.16 These immigrant families tended to be headed by
INTEGRATION: RESIDENCE LAW AND POLICY ON MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION IN 
GERMANY 28, 30-32 (2008), available at http://www.bmi.bund.de/Internet/ 
Content/Common/Anlagen/Broschueren/2008/Migration__und__Integration__en,t
emplateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/Migration_ und_ Integration_ en.pdf 
(indicating that Turkey is the country of origin for the largest group of foreigners 
living in Germany and that twice as many foreigners live in the former West 
Germany as in the former East Germany). 
 11. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Germany, https://www. 
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html (last visited Feb. 1, 
2009). 
 12. Edward J. Eberle, Free Exercise of Religion in Germany and the United 
States, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1023, 1060 (2004). 
 13. Subsequent waves of Turkish immigrants to Germany included those 
seeking political asylum, many of whom were better educated. Cf. Richard D. Alba 
et al., Ethnic Inequalities in the German School System, in PATHS TO INCLUSION: 
THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 115, 116-
17 (Peter H. Schuck & Rainer Münz eds., 1998) (suggesting that the immigration 
resulting from formal recruitment of guest workers was later replaced by asylum 
seekers because of the German Constitution’s formerly liberal asylum provision). 
 14. Cf. Nicole Jacoby, America’s De Facto Guest Workers: Lessons From 
Germany’s Gastarbeiter for U.S. Immigration Reform, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1569, 1582 (2004) (describing how the early regulations determined whether a 
guestworker could stay on the basis of a worker’s personality and whether the 
worker was “worthy of hospitality”). 
 15. See id. at 1604 (describing the reluctance of Turks to renounce Turkish 
citizenship for German citizenship because they “adhered to the dream of returning 
to their homeland”). 
 16. See id. at 1590 (noting that Turkish workers began to leave employee 
sponsored housing once their families came to Germany). 
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uneducated fathers from peasant backgrounds; they remained poor 
and relatively religious despite the secular state they left behind.17
The Turkey which the guestworkers left behind in the 1960s was a 
world apart from what they found in Germany. The guestworkers 
came from small towns dependent on an agricultural economy.18 At 
least one-third of the women were illiterate.19 Although Turkey is the 
only predominantly Muslim country which does not base its legal 
system on Sharia law, virginity largely determines an unmarried 
woman’s status: until 2002 the legal system permitted expulsion of 
school girls failing a virginity test.20 Similarly, until legal reforms 
made in connection with Turkey’s application to the European Union 
became effective in 2005, the criminal code recognized the honor 
killing of a “first degree relative[ ] involved in an illicit relationship” 
as a mitigating factor that permits reduction of the penalty in 
homicide cases.21 Small wonder that Turkish immigrants and 
Germans did not adjust easily to each other. 
Prior to an overhaul of naturalization law in 1999, relatively few 
guestworkers or their children qualified for German citizenship. The 
reforms allowed the children of foreign workers who had resided in 
 17. See, e.g., AYHAN KAYA & FERHAT KENTEL, CTR. FOR EUR. POLICY 
STUDIES, EURO-TURKS: A BRIDGE OR A BREACH BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION? 3-4, 7 (2005), available at http://shop.ceps.eu/Book 
Detail.php?item_id=1189 (discussing stereotypes of Turkish guestworkers and 
noting that Turkish guestworkers in the 1960s were more educated and skilled 
compared to Turkish guestworkers arriving in the 1970s from more rural parts of 
Turkey). 
 18. Cf. Ward, supra note 2, at 212 & n.75 (acknowledging the historical 
predominance of rural agricultural economy in Turkey). 
 19. Cf. id. (observing that—even in contemporary Turkey—a third of women 
are illiterate). A recent study of elementary school children revealed that 21.5% of 
the mothers who were raised in Turkey had less than five years of formal 
education. See BIRGIT LEYENDECKER, HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG, BILDUNGSZIELE 
VON TÜRKISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN ELTERN: WAS WIRD UNTER BILDUNG 
VERSTANDEN UND WER IST FÜR DIE VERMITTLUNG VON BILDUNG ZUSTÄNDIG? 
(2008), http://www.migration-boell.de/web/integration/47_1499.asp. 
 20. See, e.g., Marcia L. Pearson, Comment, A Blemish on the Modern Face of 
Turkey: The Historical Background and Social, Legal, and International 
Implications of Virginity Testing in Turkey, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 663, 
663-64 (2003) (explaining that a woman’s “chastity” still determines her “worth” 
in Turkey, even though the government recently stopped virginity testing by 
schools). 
 21. Rebecca E. Boon, Note, They Killed Her for Going Out with Boys: Honor 
Killings in Turkey in Light of Turkey’s Accession to the European Union and 
Lessons for Iraq, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 815, 829 (2006). 
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Germany for at least eight years to hold dual citizenship in Germany 
and their parents’ country of origin, but they must still relinquish one 
nationality by the age of eighteen.22 Despite these changes, the rate 
of citizenship remains low among the Turks in Germany, roughly 
26%.23 There is a high correlation between poverty and religiosity 
among the Turks in Germany, and the poorer, more religious Turks 
are least likely to seek citizenship.24 The low citizenship rate means 
that Turks have relatively little influence in politics, whether at the 
national level or in local elections that influence issues such as 
educational policy. 
The presence of a large group of “outsiders”—whether citizens or 
not—gives rise to a variety of concerns, especially in light of a 
declining birthrate among ethnic Germans and an aging population. 
Turks tend to be younger than persons of German origin, and they 
generally have larger families, although the original guestworkers are 
also aging.25
If and when Turkey joins the European Union, membership will 
presumably bring new waves of Turkish migrants, freer to move in 
 22. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 12, at 1603-05 (suggesting that first- and 
second-generation Turkish immigrants to Germany did not embrace German 
naturalization until Germany changed its laws to allow dual citizenship); Ruben 
Seth Fogel, Note, Headscarves in German Public Schools: Religious Minorities 
are Welcome in Germany, Unless – God Forbid – They are Religious, 51 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 618, 627 & n.66 (2006-07) (citing Ulrich Mammey & Karl Schwartz, 
The Demographic Characteristics of the Immigrant Population in Germany, in 
COUNCIL OF EUR. DIRECTORATE FOR SOC. AFFAIRS & HEALTH, THE DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS 203 (Werner Haug, Paul Compton 
& Youssef Courbage eds., 2002)) (predicting that the relaxation of old German 
laws barring dual citizenship in Turkey and Germany will yield a larger percentage 
of Muslims in the German population). 
 23. KAYA & KENTEL, supra note 13, at 95. 
 24. Cf. id. at 27 (indicating that inner city enclaves of Turkish immigrants have 
become increasingly impoverished and increasingly segregated and that these 
groups have a greater distrust of the state). 
 25. Cf. FED. STATISTICAL OFFICE, F.R.G., GERMANY’S POPULATION BY 2050: 
RESULTS OF THE 11TH COORDINATED POPULATION PROJECTION 50 (2006), 
available at http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/ 
Content/Publikationen/SpecializedPublications/Population/GermanyPopulation205
0,property=file.pdf (projecting that by 2050, the average age of Turkish people will 
be younger than the average age of the German population). See also OECD, 
International Migration Outlook, Population: age, sex and nationality, 1, January 
2006, http://statline.cbs.nl/statWeb/table.asp?STB+G1,G2,G3&LA=en&DM=SL 
EN&PA=03743 (last visited Jan. 3, 2008). 
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and out of European countries.26 How will they be assimilated? Will 
they seek assimilation or prefer to maintain primarily Turkish 
identities? Will new migrants feel merely tolerated and marginalized, 
or will they feel that they are treated as equals? Hints may be found 
in the experiences of the second-generation Turks, children of the 
guestworkers who arrived beginning in the 1970s.27
This Article draws heavily on the research conducted by social 
scientists who have applied methodologies derived from the study of 
U.S. immigrants to the case of second- and third-generation Turks in 
Europe during the last decade.28 They have examined questions such 
as whether the continuing disadvantages found among the children of 
the guestworkers are attributable in whole or in part to their 
socioeconomic status, their minority status, their sociocultural 
distance from middle class norms (i.e., lack of cultural capital), or a 
shared perception that they are transients within the community. In 
analyzing these issues it is important to ask whether disadvantages 
are embellished or diminished over time, and to remember that one 
generation remains a short period of time in which to evaluate 
integration. 
Social scientists distinguish between characteristics attributable to 
the immigrants themselves and indicators of disadvantage that are 
 26. See generally European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC, 
2004 O.J. (L 158) 77 (codifying previous directives into one instrument to provide 
nationals of EU Member States and their families the right to move freely among 
EU Member States). 
 27. The children of more recent waves of immigration are largely excluded 
from the studies on which I rely below, except to the extent that they had reached 
school age at the time the data were collected. 
 28. See Richard Alba, Bright vs. Blurred Boundaries: Second-Generation 
Assimilation and Exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States, 28 ETHNIC 
& RACIAL STUD. 20, 20 (2005) (applying observations in sociological literature on 
assimilation in the United States to the social construction of ethnicity in 
contemporary Europe). Alba points out that, although anthropologist Fredrik Barth 
conducted “pioneering investigations” of social boundaries in the 1960s, 
“relatively little work has been done to theorize their nature and the processes that 
affect them, even though it is apparent that both are critical to ethnic construction 
and change.” Id. at 20. Most of the important work has been done by academics in 
the United States, whose theories have recently been applied to the study of 
immigrants in Western Europe. See, e.g., Alba et al., supra note 22, at 120; Crul & 
Vermeulen, supra note 3, at 966-67; cf. Maurice Crul & Jeroen Doomernik, The 
Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in the Netherlands: Divergent Trends 
between and Polarization within the Two Groups, 37 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 1039 
(2003). 
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imposed by society’s legal structures and customs.29 With respect to 
the first set of issues, social scientists have examined whether the 
sources of disadvantage attributable to characteristics of the 
immigrants are immutable (such as complexion or hair color), or 
subject to reduction through the assimilation process (such as 
language, dress, or manners).30 The attitudes of the immigrants 
themselves may prove critical. Turkish scholars Ayhan Kaya and 
Ferhat Kentel identify three distinct perspectives based on their 
preliminary survey data on Euro-Turks: (1) “bridging groups,” who 
are liberal Euro-Turks who see themselves as bridging two cultures, 
with varying degrees of affiliation with the homeland and the host 
country; (2) “breaching groups,” characterized by “extreme 
religi[osity]” and nationalism for their homeland; and (3) the 
“assimilated”, whom they estimate comprise only about 20% of the 
Euro-Turkish population, with the remaining 80% divided roughly 
equally between the bridging and breaching groups.31
The indicators imposed by society include access to citizenship, 
language, religion, and education,32 all of which come into play 
when we examine the social position of German-Turks. In Germany, 
for example, the “social distance” that both symbolizes and causes 
what sociologists call a “bright boundary” (one that is difficult to 
cross) was underscored by the historical difficulty of obtaining 
naturalization.33 So too, separation persisted in the educational 
system, which is the focus of the rest of this essay. 
 II. THE STRATIFICATION OF TURKISH-GERMAN 
YOUTH IN GERMAN SCHOOLS. 
Students in German public schools are consigned to specific tracks 
that determine their life prospects from a very early age. With some 
regional variations, after fourth grade German children generally 
enter one of three school systems: the Hauptschule, the Realschule or 
 29. Cf. Alba, supra note 28, at 41 (arguing that the precise nature of each social 
boundary determines its permeability). 
 30. See, e.g., Alba et al., supra note 13, at 123. 
 31. Compare KAYA & KENTEL, supra note 17, at 69 (linking permeability of 
the immigrant-host boundary to socioeconomic and religious stratification within 
Turkish-German immigrant groups), with Alba, supra note 25, at 27-29 (discussing 
the bright and blurred types of boundaries). 
 32. See, e.g., Alba, supra note 28, at 27-37. 
 33. Id. at 27-29. 
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the Gymnasium.34 A fourth school system—the Gesamtschule—
combines all three forms of schooling under one roof, allowing 
students to move from track to track as warranted; created in the 
1970s, it primarily serves underprivileged children, including the 
children of immigrants.35
The Hauptschule is the least prestigious track; Hauptschule 
students receive “the least demanding curriculum.”36 The population 
of the Hauptschule is dominated by immigrants and other children 
deemed to be “educationally disadvantaged.” Observers report that it 
is “extremely rare” for a Hauptschule student to transition to a 
Gymnasium or gain entrance to a university.37 Precise figures are 
unavailable, but experts estimate that somewhere between two-thirds 
and three-quarters of all of the Turkish-German children in the 
German schools are assigned to the Hauptschule, in contrast to about 
one-third of German children.38 Indeed, children of Turkish origin 
are significantly more likely to be assigned to the Hauptschule than 
non-Turkish children from similar socio-economic backgrounds, as 
defined by factors such as their parents’ educational attainment and 
job, and family size.39 Children of Turkish background who were 
born in Germany are slightly less likely to be assigned to the 
Hauptschule than those who arrived in the country after age five.40
The Realschule—the middle track—offers a more solid education, 
a six-year course culminating in an examination and, after passing 
the exam, a certificate. The certificate qualifies graduates to attend
 34. See Alba et al., supra note 13, at 125. 
 35. Interview with Ralph Ghadban, in Princeton, N.J. (Oct. 24, 2008); see also 
Alba et al., supra note 13, at 124-27 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of 
each of the three educational tracks in the German systems). 
 36. Alba et al., supra note 13, at 125. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., Crul & Vermeulen, supra note 3, at 976 (observing that a greater 
proportion of Turkish children in Germany enter vocational school than of Turkish 
children in France, Belgium, or the Netherlands); Alba et al., supra note 22, at 129 
(observing that two-thirds of Turkish and Italian children, as compared to one-third 
of German children, enter vocational school). 
 39. See, e.g., Alba et al., supra note 13, at 138 (stating that children of German 
parents with non-ethnic backgrounds similar to parents of Turkish-German 
children are 13 to 16% less likely to be assigned to the Hauptschule than the 
Turkish-German children). 
 40. Id. at 137. 
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post-secondary training in a Fachhochschule where they can train for 
white-collar careers, for example, civil engineering or social work.41
The highest educational track is the Gymnasium, which offers the 
only pathway to a university education. The Gymnasium requires 
eight or nine years of study, followed by a difficult examination (the 
“Abitur”); a student must pass the Abitur to gain entrance to a 
university program.42 In the 1990s, German children were four to 
five times more likely than Turkish children to gain entrance to a 
Gymnasium.43 A government survey conducted in 2005-2006 
reported that 44.7% of children of German background were enrolled 
in a Gymnasium, compared to only 13.2% of children who reported 
Turkish origin, reflecting large disparities but some progress over the 
last decade.44 Children from other immigrant groups, such as those 
from Greece and the former Yugoslavia, are more likely to enter a 
Gymnasium than the children of Turks or Italians.45
Increasingly, as the labor market has tightened, assignment to a 
lower track also reduces a child’s chance of being placed in an 
apprenticeship for a skilled job. Young people in the Realschules and 
even Gymnasium students compete for apprenticeships and often 
prevail over Hauptschule students. Gymnasium students have better 
opportunities than those in the lower tracks to obtain apprenticeships 
in skilled or white-collar occupations that carry prospects for good 
income, security, and social prestige, and large numbers of 
university-bound students also pursue apprenticeships.46 Even with 
this stiff competition from students from the higher tracks, German 
Hauptschule students entering an apprenticeship outnumber those 
who do not by 3 to 1.47 However, roughly half of all children of 
 41. See id. at 125. 
 42. See id. at 124-25. 
 43. See id. at 128. 
 44. Beauftragte Für Migration, Flüchtlinge, und Integration, F.R.G., Bericht der 
Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration über 
die Lage der Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in Deutschland [Report of the 
Representative of the Federal Government For Migration, Refugees and 
Integration on the Situation of Foreigners in Germany] 58 (2007), available at 
HTTP://WWW.BUNDESREGIERUNG.DE/CONTENT/DE/PUBLIKATION/IB/ANLAGEN/AU
SLAENDERBERICHT-7,PROPERTY=PUBLICATIONFILE.PDF. 
 45. See Alba et al., supra note 13, at 129 (explaining that Greeks have an 
advantage over other immigrant groups because their children attend a separate 
Gymnasium system for Greek students in some parts of Germany). 
 46. See id. at 130-31. 
 47. Id. at 130 (adding that only approximately one in ten Germans leave school 
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immigrants in the Hauptschule leave school without either a 
certificate or apprenticeship.48 As a result, Turks and other children 
of immigrants, such as those from the former Yugoslavia, leave the 
Hauptschule with minimal education. They are approximately 1.5 
times more likely to lack a certificate (required for many jobs and to 
qualify for an apprenticeship) than their German peers.49 About one-
third of the children of immigrants coming out of the Hauptschule 
fail to receive an apprenticeship, and those who do are concentrated 
in a limited range of jobs where wages are low and full time jobs 
scarce, such as beautician for girls or mechanic for boys.50 It should 
be noted, however, that despite their concentration in the lower 
educational tracks and limited vocational training, second-generation 
Turks have made some modest economic progress when compared to 
their parents.51
It may be tempting to attribute the high concentration of youth of 
Turkish origin in the lower tracks to intentional discrimination, but 
the reality appears to be more complex. Parental aspirations play a 
role in assignment to a course of schooling in every culture. Many 
Turkish parents may not understand the stakes, and may not advocate 
for their children when the assignments to tracks are made in fourth 
grade.52 Further complexities arise when parents plan to return to 
Turkey because they may not see the value of an education they do 
not expect their children to use.53
When it comes time to assign children to the differing educational 
tracks, teachers and school administrators exercise enormous 
discretion. Teachers may unintentionally discount the talents of 
Turkish-German youth, especially those who do not speak German at 
with a Hauptschule diploma and no apprenticeship). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. at 130, 139. 
 50. Id. at 130-31. 
 51. See generally Wolfgang Seifert, Social and Economic Integration of 
Foreigners in Germany, in PATHS TO INCLUSION: THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 83 (Peter H. Schuck & Rainer Münz eds., 
1998) (noting also that immigrants from Turkey have been disadvantaged in the 
labor market by competition with “immigrants” from East to West Germany and 
from other EU countries). 
 52. See Alba et al., supra note 13, at 127 (arguing that immigrant parents may 
not understand the “near finality” of the linkage between the educational track and 
“different tiers of the labor market”). 
 53. Id. 
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home.54 Indeed, the extent to which the child’s family functions well 
in the German language and has made strides toward assimilation is 
the best predictor of whether the child will be assigned to the 
Hauptschule. Three-quarters of children who have one parent who is 
not fluent in German are assigned to the Hauptschule.55 The 
available research does not yet offer reliable conclusions about 
whether these placements are the result of prejudice, are tied to 
underperformance in primary school, or perhaps, are traceable to 
factors that inhibit the parents’ ability to advocate for a higher 
placement. 
Comparative data suggest that several factors promote better 
educational outcomes for immigrant and second-generation youth. 
These include starting school at an earlier age, having more contact 
hours with teachers, availability of help from outside the family with 
homework, and later assignment to an educational track.56 Turkish 
children in Germany, who do not enter school until age six and 
initially attend for only half the day, receive no help with homework 
from the state, and are consigned to educational tracks at age ten fare 
poorly compared with their immigrant peers in France and Belgium. 
In the latter countries, children start school at age two and one-half, 
attend for the full day, receive mentoring for homework, and are not 
assigned to educational tracks until age 14 or 15.57 Experts conclude 
that the Turkish children in Germany “are in the worst possible 
situation:”58 They start school relatively late, spend fewer hours in 
school, receive no structural support outside of school, and then are 
assigned to stratified tracks just four years after beginning their 
education, with no time to catch up. As a result, “Germany performs 
worst of all” among European countries with respect to educating its 
migrant children.59
While Germany’s educational policies exacerbate the problems 
 54. Cf. Crul & Doomernik, supra note 28, at 1050 (finding such “unconscious 
lower[ing]” of standards in the Netherlands). 
 55. Alba et al., supra note 13, at 144. 
 56. Crul & Vermeulen, supra note 3, at 978-79. In France and Belgium, 
students begin school at two and one-half years of age and are not assigned to an 
educational track until they reach fourteen or fifteen, whereas in Germany students 
do not start school util they are six, and are assigned to an educational track at ten 
years of age. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 979. 
 59. Id. 
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Turkish-German children confront, the state’s choices do not account 
for all of the variations between Turks and other immigrant groups, 
inside or outside of Germany. Alba et al. suggest that immersion in a 
thriving ex-patriot social community may be as important to school 
assignment as parental failure to acquire language skills or starting 
school before age six.60 Fully two-thirds of children whose 
household head (generally the father) identifies another Turk as his 
closest friend are found in the lowest track.61 The more evidence that 
strong communal bonds enrich an immigrant family’s life, the more 
likely the child will be assigned to a lower school track. If “progress” 
is measured by the degree of assimilation attained, Turks appear to 
be making slow progress in Germany.62
According to Alba et al. three possible explanations account for 
the persistent disadvantage of Turkish youth when compared to 
groups that arrived in Germany more recently. First, the Turks are 
immersed in their own ethnic and cultural world, including friends, 
language and food. Second, many parents still think of themselves as 
sojourners. They intend to return to their homeland, even if they 
never do so, and some of them send their children back to Turkey for 
at least part of their schooling. Third, they may be the victims of 
discrimination. Immersion in Turkish culture proves to be the most 
important factor distinguishing the Turks from other immigrant 
groups.63 It appears that the strong communal bonds among Turks 
that enrich daily life may hold their children back from educational 
and economic achievement in Germany. 
A major break with the Turkish family and community may 
accompany strides toward upward mobility. Consider the story of 
Nehmet, a Turk born and raised in Germany who is a professor at a 
 60. See Alba et al., supra note 13, at 144-45 (describing the ethnic 
characteristics of immigrant students in Hauptschule, showing that the German-
speaking ability of parents and the ethnic composition of neighborhoods are good 
indicators of an immigrant students success in the German educational system). 
 61. Id. at 144; cf. Seifert, supra note 51, at 98 (noting that even among the 
second generation, who speak German better than their parents did, the vast 
majority do not name a single German among their three closest friends). If the 
head of household’s friendships continue to serve as a predictor of school 
placement, this does not auger well for the school success of the third generation. 
 62. See Crul & Vermeulen, supra note 3, at 983 (showing similar results 
among the Turkish immigrant population in the Netherlands). 
 63. See Alba et al., supra note 13, at 145-46. 
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university in the United States.64 Nehmet is the eldest of three 
children of a Turkish laborer who had come to Germany as a guest 
worker. Neither of his parents completed secondary school, and 
neither held a skilled job. When Nehmet was in fourth grade, his 
teacher offered him a boost: the teacher assigned Nehmet to a 
Realschule, the middle track. For reasons he has never explained, 
Nehmet’s father protested, arguing that Nehmet should be in 
Gymnasium. The school took the position that if the boy could not 
succeed in Gymnasium and had to be placed back into the 
Realschule after a few months or more, it would be a humiliating and 
public defeat.65 Ultimately, Nehmet entered Gymnasium where he 
was the only person of Turkish origin in his class. When he reached 
high school he decided to come to the United States as an exchange 
student, a plan he developed and pursued on his own. He never 
returned to Germany to study or live.66 Instead, after a year with an 
American family, he received a scholarship to a small liberal arts 
college in the American south and from there went on to an Ivy 
League university where he earned a Ph.D. Nehmet’s younger 
brother completed Realschule and works in a restaurant.67 His older 
sister is a housewife and mother of two, although she completed an 
Ausbildung (apprenticeship) as a hairdresser and eventually obtained 
a Meisterbrief (master craftsman’s diploma).68 In short, Nehmet’s 
biography does not offer any magic bullet for dramatic mobility in 
family culture. 
Researchers in the Netherlands suggest that the influence of an 
older sibling or other relative outside the nuclear family who can 
help mediate between generations may prove pivotal to educational 
 64. Interview with Anonymous (Jan. 9, 2008). To protect his privacy, and with 
his permission, in this Article the subject of this interview will be referred to as 
“Nehmet.” 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. Apparently many Turks born in Germany who earn German university 
degrees also leave the country or want to do so. A recent survey of 250 Turkish-
Germans with university degrees revealed that 38% of them were considering 
moving to Turkey where their skills would be valued, the cost of living is lower, 
and they would be accepted socially. Michael Sontheimer, Jung, gut und 
unerwünscht, DER SPIEGEL, May 19, 2008, at 52. To the extent that they follow 
through, positive role models for children in the Turkish-German community will 
become scarcer. Id. 
 67. See Interview with Anonymous (Jan. 9, 2008). 
 68. Id. 
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achievement for second-generation immigrants.69 These outside 
influences may help with homework, and offer both positive and 
negative examples: some have pursued higher educational tracks and 
been rewarded; others—especially women—may have married early, 
left school, and regretted their own lack of options.70
The experience of those who cross bright boundaries and leave the 
worlds of their family and childhood behind is not easy. Social 
science research indicates that where boundaries are bright, and 
where people know which side of the boundary they stand on, 
assimilation: 
will generally be experienced by the individual as something 
akin to a conversion, i.e., a departure from one group and a 
discarding of signs of membership in it, linked to an attempt 
to enter into another, with all the social and psychic burdens a 
conversion entails: growing distance from peers, feelings of 
disloyalty, and anxieties about acceptance.71
The personal price of boundary crossing may mean that some 
individuals do not even aspire to make the journey. To the contrary, 
some Euro-Turks resist “assimilation,” which they expressly contrast 
to “integration”: the former means becoming culturally European, 
and the latter means preserving Turkish culture and identity while 
gaining access to education and jobs.72 But this choice imposes costs. 
Young people who choose to preserve a primary identification as 
Turkish, and even use Turkish as their primary language, are 
disadvantaged in education and employment.73 This pattern is 
consistent with research on the “downward assimilation” of some 
 69. See Crul & Doomernik, supra note 28, at 1052, 1054 (declaring these 
findings to be especially strong for girls whose older sisters married very young, 
and who urge their younger siblings to pursue an education). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Alba, supra note 28, at 24. 
 72. See KAYA & KENTEL, supra note 17, at 69 (explaining that a majority of 
Euro-Turks have integrated in their host countries, while only approximately 20% 
of Euro-Turks have assimilated and gained citizenship in their host countries); cf. 
Fulya Özerkan, Turk-German Ties Coming Apart at the Seams, TURKISH DAILY 
NEWS, Feb. 13, 2008, available at http://turkishdailynews.comtr/article.php? 
enewsid=96303 (reporting that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
denounces “assimilation” as “a crime against humanity”). 
 73. See Özerkan, supra note 72 (citing “problems” with second- and even 
third-generation Turks who lack German language skills and noting “a real 
problem” with unemployment among young Turks in Germany). 
700 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:685 
 
minority youth in the United States who consciously or not “elect the 
path of ethnic loyalty” and join subcultures “established in 
opposition to mainstream norms.”74 Contemporary concerns in 
Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, about the potential lure of radical 
Islam for young people who feel excluded or disadvantaged reflect 
awareness of this alternative path,75 and are a critical backdrop 
against which to consider religious identity and education in 
Germany’s public schools. 
III. OUTSIDER STATUS, IDENTITY AND 
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN GERMANY’S PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 
Despite constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, religious 
training is integrated into the public school curriculum in Germany in 
ways that disadvantage the country’s considerable Muslim 
population. Students in Germany are permitted to express individual 
religious or cultural identity by, for example, veiling, so the dispute 
over student religious garb has not been central to policy debates in 
Germany as it has in other European democracies.76 Instead, the 
debate centers on questions about who speaks for the Muslim 
community and the nature of religious training offered during the 
school day. For German-Turks, the perception that they are outsiders 
is reinforced when they are singled out not to receive religious 
training in school, and in more subtle ways through signals that they 
are not respected or valued. 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
When Germany adopted its Constitution (known as the Basic 
Law) in 1949, virtually all of its residents were Christians, whether 
 74. Alba, supra note 28, at 25. 
 75. See generally Robert S. Leiken, Europe’s Angry Muslims, FOREIGN AFF., 
July-Aug. 2005, at 120, 127, 132-33 (studying the root causes and effects of the 
spread of radical Islam among descendants of Muslim immigrants in Europe). 
 76. See, e.g., CATHERINE J. ROSS, CHILDREN AND RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN 
SCHOOL: A COMPARATIVE TREATMENT OF THE VEIL AND OTHER RELIGIOUS 
SYMBOLS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 1, 2 (2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136366. The German Constitutional Court banned 
teachers from wearing headscarves in public schools. Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
[BVerfG] [Constitutional Court] Sept. 24, 2003, 108 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 282 (F.R.G.). 
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Protestants or Roman Catholics. The Christian Democrat Party, in 
power in 1949 and for decades after, proclaimed that the values of 
the Basic Law mirrored the fundamental values of Christianity, 
which they saw as inclusive rather than exclusive.77 Drafted in the 
wake of World War II, the Basic Law rigorously protects freedom of 
religion.78 However, in contrast to the United States, the German 
Constitution expressly provides for religious instruction in public 
schools.79 Most German states reserve two hours each week for 
instruction in religion or values.80 Article Seven of the Basic Law 
provides that parents shall designate the religion in which they want 
their children to receive instruction and have the right to opt out of 
religious instruction.81 Parents may also elect non-religious values 
training known as “secular humanist” ethics or “philosophy” instead 
of a religious course of instruction.82
 77. See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] 
[Constitution] (F.R.G.); Peter C. Caldwell, The Crucifix and German 
Constitutional Culture, 11 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 259, 263 (1996). 
 78. See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] 
[Constitution] art. 4 (F.R.G.) (providing in pertinent part: “(1) Freedom of faith 
and of conscience, and freedom of creed religious or ideological, are inviolable. 
(2) The undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed.”). 
 79. Compare id. art. 7 (guaranteeing that “(2) The persons entitled to bring up a 
child have the right to decide whether they shall receive religious instruction.  
(3) Religious instruction forms part of the ordinary curriculum in state and 
municipal schools, excepting secular schools. Without prejudice to the state’s right 
of supervision, religious instruction is given in accordance with the tenets of the 
religious communities.”), with Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947) 
(finding that it is a violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause for a 
state to reimburse parents for bussing to religious schools); Abington Twp. Sch. 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (prohibiting public schools from 
requiring a prayer in schools because it violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment). 
 80. See Roger Cohen, Long Dispute Ends as Berlin Court Backs Islamic School 
Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1998, at A13. 
 81. Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Private Religious Choice in German and American 
Constitutional Law: Government Funding and Government Religious Speech, 31 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1127, 1147-50 (1998) (providing a general overview of 
religious instruction in German public schools); Eberle, supra note 12, at 1032 
(describing parents’ rights to religious education for their children under the 
German Basic Law). In some ways, the German approach may be comparable to 
Justice O’Connor’s vision of individual choice made by private parties when 
parents use vouchers to send their children to sectarian schools. See Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing 
the Court’s emphasis on verifying that parents exercise “true private choice” in 
placing their children in religious schools). 
 82. Cf. Edward J. Eberle, Religion in the Classroom in Germany and the 
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In Germany, the constitutional structure relies on religious groups 
to mediate between the religion and the state. In each instance, the 
religion or humanist course is administered by one incorporated body 
that represents the entire group (e.g., Lutherans, Roman Catholics, 
Jews, secular humanists). The state delegates authority to the 
recognized group representative to develop the curriculum and to 
teach the religion classes in the public school building during school 
hours.83
Islam has no organizational structure comparable to 
“congregations” united within a denominational hierarchy.84 In the 
absence of a uniform hierarchy that can be deemed to speak for all 
Muslims, the German government has concluded that no 
representative speaks for the Muslim citizens.85 For this reason, and 
others that will be explored below, most of the states and cities in 
Germany do not offer Muslim religious training during school hours. 
It appears to be undisputed that there is no city or state in Germany 
in which the public schools treat Islam in a manner comparable to the 
treatment accorded the branches of Christianity.86
In the absence of official Islamic instruction in school, Muslim 
parents are often allowed to send their children to mosques during 
the periods set aside for religious training.87 Many Muslim parents, 
United States, 81 TUL. L. REV. 67, 76-77 (2006) (stating that three states—Bremen, 
Berlin and Brandenberg—are permitted not to offer religious instruction in 
schools). 
 83. See id. at 71. 
 84. See Wuerth, supra note 81, at 1156 (explaining that one argument for not 
treating Islamic instruction equally to Christian studies is because Islam lacks an 
organizational structure, thus making it too decentralized to meet the requirements 
of a “religious community” within the meaning of the Basic Law’s Article Seven, 
which provides for religious instruction in public schools). 
 85. See id. (suggesting that administrative complications resulting from the 
lack of fixed content for Islam in Germany are another reason German states give 
for not treating instruction of Islam on par with that of Christian religions). 
 86. See id. (asserting that although most German states accept the theory of 
treating Islamic education equally with Christian education, they do not do so in 
practice); Sabine Ripperger, Teaching of Islam in German Schools Gains Ground, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE, May 27, 2007, available at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/ 
article/0,2144,2553750,00.html (“More than 700,000 Muslim students attend 
school in Germany, but nowhere does the religious curriculum deal with Islam in 
the same way as Christianity.”). 
 87. See Lucian Kim, Dilemma for Muslims in Berlin, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Mar. 10, 2000, at 6; Ripperger, supra note 86 (explaining that “most 
schools rely on their local mosque for guidance” resulting in “large discrepancies 
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however, object on several grounds. Some disagree with the 
particular brand of Islam taught in the mosque near their children’s 
school, and, in particular, express fears that the mosques will 
indoctrinate their children in radical brands of Islam.88 Other parents 
may object to the fact that if they decline to send their children to a 
mosque for instruction, their children will remain idle while 
Christians and others receive religious instruction on site.89
B. ISLAMIC INSTRUCTION IN THE CITY OF  
BERLIN SCHOOL SYSTEM 
The confusion over who speaks for Germany’s Muslims dates 
back to at least 1980 and has intensified since the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. In 1980, the Islamic 
Federation began to seek permission to provide the religious 
instruction for Muslims in West Berlin’s schools.90 The Islamic 
Federation is affiliated with Turkey’s Welfare Party, a populist 
Islamic movement which is monitored by Germany’s Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution.91 Consistent with German policy, 
West Berlin declined to recognize any religious corporation that did 
not speak for all of its co-religionists. During the 1980s an 
experiment with Muslim religious training in schools in one German 
in the content and quality” of religious instruction). 
 88. See Kim, supra note 87; cf. Richard Bernstein, Lessons of Islam in German 
Classrooms, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2004, at A4 (discussing Berlin officials’ 
suspicions that Islamic classes, which non-Muslims are not allowed to attend, may 
be teaching an intolerant form of Islam); Wuerth, supra note 74, at 1157 
(suggesting that German state officials are making an effort to offer in-school 
Islamic education to discourage students from attending private Koran school, 
which they view as “extremist”); Dilek Güngör, Eltern Fordern Kontrolle über 
Lerninhalte [Parents ask for Control Over Learning], BERLINER ZEITUNG, Nov. 5, 
1998, available at http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump. 
fcgi/1998/1105/none/0064/index.html (expressing parents’ concerns that private 
Koran education is difficult to control). 
 89. See Lucian Kim, Dilemma for Muslims in Berlin: Some parents are uneasy 
that an Islamic group last month was put in charge of religion classes in schools, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 10, 2000, at 6 (“‘I would never send my children 
to such an organization, because I know that one day they may be poisoned,’ says 
Ahmet Cengiz, a teacher and the father of two school-age children.”). 
 90. See Kim, supra note 87 (explaining that the Islamic Federation’s ten-year 
struggle for permission to teach the Koran in Berlin public schools required the 
German federal court’s designation of the group as a “religious community”). 
 91. Mulrine, supra note 1, at 36. 
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state offered classes in the Turkish language.92 This approach may be 
criticized from two directions: first, it marginalizes Turkish children 
by encouraging them to speak Turkish instead of German (one of the 
factors tied to consignment to the lowest educational track93), and 
second, it makes it difficult for school officials to know what is 
going on in the classroom. 
After years of fruitless negotiation, in 1998 proponents of Islamic 
education won a court order requiring Berlin (now a unified city) to 
provide religious training in school for the city’s roughly 35,000 
Muslim students.94 The Islamic Federation, which represented a 
portion of the city’s roughly 225,000 Muslim residents, was 
designated to offer the classes. But many of the city’s Muslims 
objected to the radicalism of the Federation. In addition, the Berlin 
City Council wanted the classes offered in the German language, 
while the Federation planned to offer the classes in Turkish.95
An appellate ruling followed in 2000, upholding the initial order 
and the designation of the Federation as the representative group.96 
Again, many Muslim parents objected, primarily on the grounds that 
they wanted a modern curriculum “based on democratic values,” 
including tolerance.97 Such concerns may well be justified. In 2005, 
the principal of a school in Berlin entered the Islamic classroom 
under the guise of repairing a window after the instructors had 
refused her request to observe the lessons. She reported culturally 
objectionable curriculum, including instruction in gender 
discrimination. The teacher informed the children, for example, that 
“women are for the house, for the children.” The girls, she said, 
appeared subdued, eyes cast downward, in contrast to their demeanor 
 92. Mathieu Magnaudeix, Germany’s Muslims to Unite so Islam Can be 
Taught in Schools, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 2, 2005 (discussing Bavaria). In 
several other parts of Germany, diplomatic representatives of Turkey provide 
language instruction in Turkish, which may include some religious instruction, a 
departure from the general provisions governing religious instruction in schools. 
Wuerth, supra note 81, at 1156. 
 93. See discussion, supra Part I. 
 94. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] Feb. 
23, 2000, 110 Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerwGE] 326 
(F.R.G.) (affirming the lower court’s order). 
 95. Cohen, supra note 80. 
 96. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] Feb. 
23, 2000, 110 Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerwGE] 326 
(F.R.G.). 
 97. Kim, supra note 87. 
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during secular classes. This, she concluded, “is fundamentalism,” 
which she argued should be barred from German schools.98
Although religious classes are being offered, the court orders did 
not fully resolve the controversy. In addition to lingering debates 
about the nature of the religious curriculum, only a small portion of 
Berlin’s Muslim students have enrolled—4,500 between 2003 and 
2007.99 Several Muslim groups began a collaborative effort to 
develop a curriculum for religious training, but one important group 
has boycotted the project. Despite these problems, one commentator 
states that imams currently provide religious instruction to Muslim 
students in more than thirty Berlin schools.100
The opinion of the Berlin courts has no impact on most states in 
Germany, because Berlin, Brandenburg, and Bremen are exempt 
from the Constitutional requirement that the state pay for and 
supervise religious education in public schools.101 In 2005, the 
Federal Administrative Court issued an opinion in a case arising 
from the state’s denial of a petition from two Islamic umbrella 
organizations seeking the right to offer religious instruction in the 
public schools of North Rhine-Westphalia—a state in which the 
constitutional provision applies.102 The court remanded the case to 
the lower court after establishing some guidelines for evaluating the 
claim. Much of the decision involved the question of whether the 
umbrella groups satisfied the Constitutional definition of a “religious 
 98. Mulrine, supra note 1, at 36 (describing the increased problems at 
Rixdorfer school in neighborhood known as Little Istanbul since the German court 
permitted the Islamic Federation to conduct Muslim religious instruction in Berlin 
schools). 
 99. Ripperger, supra note 86 (noting further that the Islamic Federation expects 
the number enrolled to increase in the coming years and is calling for schools to 
begin long term planning to keep up with increased demand for Islamic instruction 
in public schools). 
 100. Interview with Ralph Ghadban, (German scholar and writer, involved with 
the educaton of immigrant youth in Germany) in Princeton, N.J. (Oct. 24, 2008). 
 101. See Diana Zacharias, Access of Muslim Organizations to Religious 
Instruction in Public Schools: Comment on the Decision of the Federal 
Administrative Court of 23 February 2005, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1319, 1333 (2005). 
(noting that the distinction between educational requirements in these cities and the 
rest of Germany dates back to how the nation was governed following the loss of 
World War II). 
 102. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] Feb. 
23, 2005, 123 Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerwGE] 49 
(F.R.G.); Zacharias, supra note 94, at 1321. 
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community” qualified to offer instruction. On remand, the lower 
court determined that the petitioners did not constitute a “religious 
community,” and dismissed the case.103 More importantly, the 
Federal Administrative Court identified additional requirements for 
eligibility to offer religious instruction in cooperation with the state. 
These include clear rules about membership to enable the schools to 
identify students who should attend, and a commitment from the 
religious community that it will respect the educational goals of the 
state, including religious tolerance.104
For now, most German schools continue to rely on nearby 
mosques to provide off-site Islamic instruction. Splits among Sunnis, 
Shia, Alevis, and others continue to plague efforts to develop a 
uniform curriculum.105 Indeed, the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg 
announced a plan to offer separate courses in its public schools: one 
for Sunnis and Shia, and another for Alevis.106 The State of North 
Rhine-Westphalia has accepted the application of the Alevitic 
Community of Germany to provide instruction in the Alevitic branch 
of Islam in its schools.107
Recently, some religious leaders have encouraged Muslim parents 
to be more receptive to their children’s assimilation. For example, in 
April 2006, “the new chairman of the Central Muslim Council in 
Germany” urged those parents who had resisted to allow their 
children to participate in co-educational gym classes and school trips 
“to foster better integration” into the school population.108
C. BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO INTEGRATION 
As with other minorities all over the world, German-Turks are 
subject to express as well as subtle forms of exclusion. In Bavaria, 
 103. Cf. Lamya Kaddor, Classes in Islamic Religion and Studies at German 
Schools, GOETHE INSTITUT, Apr. 2007 (Andrew Sims, trans.), 
http://www.goethe.de/wis/sub/thm/int/en2131719.html (“Even today, the Muslim 
umbrella organisations cannot legally act as partners in the sense of religious 
communities representing the Muslims living in Germany.”). Other groups have 
subsequently sought accreditation to offer Islamic instruction in the state. 
 104. See Zacharias, supra note 101, at 1329-31 . 
 105. See Ripperger, supra note 86. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Zacharias, supra note 101, at 1333. 
 108. Frances Mechan-Schmidt, Muslim U-turn on PE and Sex Lessons, TIMES 
EDUC. SUPP., Apr. 7, 2006. It is unclear how much influence the Council has 
among Turks, since there are presently no Turkish members of the Council. Id. 
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for example, the crucifix is still prominently displayed in most 
schools, although the courts have ruled that it must be removed if 
anyone objects.109 Such symbols send a powerful message of 
outsider status—even disrespect—to non-adherents who have to 
identify themselves to demand that the school remove the crucifix. 
A telling example occurred in a German history class when the 
teacher was discussing Kristallnacht, the evening of notorious attacks 
on Jewish shops and synagogues on November 9, 1938. The lesson, 
designed to teach empathy and tolerance, turned into a reminder of 
Turkish vulnerability: 
A Turkish student asked why the Jews had not fled Germany. 
The teacher replied by asking why the Turks do not flee 
Germany today, following murders, assaults, and arson 
attacks against them. The student answered, “Things won’t 
get that bad.” The teacher replied, that is what many Jews 
believed as well and thereby found it difficult to leave, just as 
a Turk who owns a shop or an apartment in Germany today 
would find it difficult to leave without his or her possessions. 
This effort to build on the student’s own experience and 
position in this context may make empathy an ingredient of 
education—but it also communicates: you, like the Jews, are 
vulnerable here, there is no long-term future for you here.110
Such messages may well exacerbate tendencies to alienation, 
leading young German-Turks to reject Western norms, including 
norms of toleration and gender equality, and encourage them to flirt 
with radicalism.111
 109. BVerfG, Oct. 27, 1997, docket number 1 BvR 1604/97, at juris 
online/Rechtsprechung; see Alba, supra note 25, at 33. 
 110. Martha Minow, Tolerance in an Age of Terror, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
453, 493 (2007). 
 111. See id. at 494 (warning of the danger of “competitive intolerance”: in 
which rejection of “Western norms” leads Muslim immigrants to ask themselves 
why they should be tolerant of those who are intolerant of them). Other parts of 
Western Europe also fear that alienation of Muslim immigrant populations will 
exacerbate the threat of radicalism. See Mulrine, supra note 1, at 36 (discussing the 
concerns of “overwhelmingly unreligious” Europeans that Islam and democracy 
cannot coexist and fears that radical Muslims are attempting to take advantage of 
democratic values to further extremism); IAN BURUMA, MURDER IN AMSTERDAM: 
LIBERAL EUROPE, ISLAM, AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE 30-35 (2006) 
(suggesting the “clash of values” between Islam and the West, including views on 
gender equality and individualism, contributed to the 2004 murder of Dutch 
filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, by an Islamic extremist who believed one of his films 
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The state is lending muscle to integration efforts. For example, a 
court in Duesseldorf upheld a fine imposed on parents whose 
children did not engage in school sports for religious reasons.112 
Broader changes are also being introduced. A new immigration law 
effective in 2005 established German language courses for new 
immigrants, and directed the government to take measures to 
promote integration.113 Further statutory changes in 2007 provided 
that immigrants arriving to join their spouses in Germany must either 
speak some German or enroll in government-sponsored language 
classes.114 Many German-Turks protested against what they 
apparently regarded as forced assimilation.115 Nonetheless, in the 
context of educational achievement for the children of immigrants, it 
seems clear that it cannot hurt children attending German schools to 
have parents who can speak to their teachers and help at least 
minimally with their homework. 
In 2006 and 2007 the federal government convened national 
conferences on integration that focused in large part on the 
educational system.116 The conferences led to a series of social, 
economic, and educational reforms to be implemented by local, state, 
and federal governments. The innovations include steps to reduce the 
gap in language development between children of Turkish origin and 
insulted Mohammed). 
 112. See Mechan-Schmidt, supra note 101 (describing a case in which the court, 
reasoning that “scantily-clad” girls are everywhere, upheld a fine against Muslim 
parents who forbade their son from attending swimming lessons). 
 113. See Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur 
Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern 
[Zuwanderungsgesetz] [Immigration Law], Aug. 5, 2004, BGBl. I at 1950, §§ 42-
45 (F.R.G.). 
 114. See, e.g., Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die 
Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet [Aufenthaltsgesetz] [Residency Act], 
July 30, 2004, BGBl. I at 1950, amended by Gesetz zur Umsetzung aufenthalts- 
und asylrechtlicher Richtlinien der Europäischen Union [Act for the 
Transformation of Residency and Asylum Rights Guidelines of the European 
Union], Aug. 19, 2007, BGBl. I at 1970, art. 1, § 30 (F.R.G.). 
 115. David Gordon Smith, Immigration Law ‘Hits Turks Below the Belt’, 
SPIEGEL ONLINE, July 12, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/ 
0,1518,494027,00.html (describing the boycott of a German integration summit by 
several Turkish groups). 
 116. DIE BUNDESREGIERUNG, F.R.G., DER NATIONALE INTEGRATIONSPLAN: 
NEUE WEGE – NEUE CHANCEN [THE NATIONAL INTEGRATION PLAN: NEW PATHS – 
NEW OPPORTUNITIES] (2007), available at http://www.bundesregierung.de/ 
Content/DE/Artikel/2007/07/Anlage/2007-10-18-nationaler-integrationsplan,prope 
rty=publicationFile.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL INTEGRATION PLAN]. 
2009] PERENNIAL OUTSIDERS 709 
 
ethnic Germans when they start school, moving to a full school day 
rather than the half day system that relied on parents to supplement 
lessons, and providing information to parents about the education 
system and what it expects of students and their parents.117 These 
changes supplement other programs introduced by the government in 
the last decade or so, including pairing children with adults who can 
help with schoolwork (“Bildungspaten”), and better vocational 
training for the children of immigrants.118
Despite these efforts, most children in the German-Turkish 
community today remain outsiders. Liberated from Ataturk’s 
enforced public secularism, they may use that freedom to identify 
with fundamentalist religion. They may be misled by the proclaimed 
right to manifest their religion in public, not understanding that doing 
so may diminish their chances of assimilation and material success. 
They may even prove susceptible, as many Europeans fear, to 
recruitment into antisocial behaviors, including violence or 
terrorism.119
How, then, to facilitate education and social mobility, while 
allowing immigrants who choose to do so to preserve their cultural 
identity, religion, and self-respect? Success in finding answers to 
these questions may well determine the future relationship between 
Euro-Turks and their hosts as more Turks become citizens of 
European countries and Turkey moves toward accession. 
 117. See id. at 25-26, 64-65; see also BUNDESAMT FÜR MIGRATION UND 
FLÜCHTLINGE, F.R.G., INTEGRATION IN ZAHLEN [INTEGRATION IN FIGURES] 12 
(2006), available at http://www.integration-in-deutschland.de/cln_101/nn_442496/ 
SharedDocs/ Anlagen/DE/DasBAMF/Publikationen/broschuere-integration-in-zahl 
en-2006,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/broschuere-integration-in-za 
hlen-2006.pdf (emphasizing the importance of mothers’ attending integration 
courses because of their ability to influence their children’s education). 
 118. See, e.g., NATIONAL INTEGRATION PLAN, supra note 116, at 65; 
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DES INNERN, F.R.G., WILLKOMMEN IN DEUTSCHLAND: 
INFORMATIONEN FÜR ZUWANDERER—INTEGRATIONSKURS [WELCOME TO 
GERMANY: INFORMATION FOR IMMIGRANTS—INTEGRATION COURSE] 3 (2005), 
available at http://www.bmi.bund.de/Internet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Brosch 
ueren/2006/WiD__Integrationskurse__de,templateId=raw,property=publicationFil
e.pdf/WiD_Integrationskurse_de.pdf. 
 119. Ward, supra note 2, at 225; see, e.g., ORHAN PAMUK, SNOW 79-80 
(Maureen Freely trans., Alfred A. Knopf 2004) (2002) (discussing a fictional 
depiction of this susceptibility: “I became used to feeling degraded, and I came to 
understand how my brothers felt.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The distinctive legal and cultural norms in each society influence 
how individuals manage issues of identity, inclusion, and exclusion. 
In Germany, a number of legal and cultural boundaries have 
inhibited the assimilation of second-generation Turks. These 
include—on the side of the cultural boundary controlled by the state 
and the dominant culture—the historical difficulty of gaining 
citizenship, overrepresentation in the lowest educational tracks, and 
modest occupational mobility, as well as the constitutionalization of 
religious identity and training in the public schools. If Islamic 
nationalists assume responsibility for Islamic religious training in 
Germany’s public schools, they threaten to undermine the very 
tolerance for diversity that the Basic Law arguably promotes. 
Moderate Muslim parents would be left with a choice between 
allowing their children to be taught a brand of religion with which 
they disagree or appearing to ignore their children’s religious and 
ethical upbringing. 
On the other side of the cultural boundary—controlled by Turkish 
immigrants themselves—the strong ethnic ties and identification 
with the homeland that characterize German-Turks provide meaning 
and comfort in daily life, but appear to impede assimilation, 
educational success, and economic opportunity. The proud assertion 
of “otherness” may be both a product of and a stimulus to 
discrimination, in ways that lie beyond the law’s ability to control. 
 
